A new Secretary of State hasn’t opened the job with a Latin America tour in more than a century. That streak ended this month, and the timing was no accident. On a six-day swing through Panama, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, Marco Rubio made the hemisphere—migration, trade, and China—his first order of business. The move landed amid fresh controversy over the Panama Canal and signaled a sharp turn in how Washington plans to work with its neighbors.
Why this tour matters
State Department history is full of first trips to Europe or Asia. The last time a Secretary of State launched with a broad Latin America tour was 1912, when Philander Knox spent a month in the region. Colin Powell’s quick 2001 stop in Mexico with President George W. Bush doesn’t compare. Rubio’s week-long itinerary was longer, broader, and pegged to specific headaches for the United States right now.
Rubio previewed the approach in a Wall Street Journal op-ed titled “An Americas First Foreign Policy,” arguing the countries on his list “all stand to benefit tremendously from greater cooperation with the U.S.” He added, “Making America great again also means helping our neighbors achieve greatness.” The framing matters: it’s the Trump administration’s domestic slogan translated into a hemispheric policy test.
Three issues sat at the center: slowing illegal migration, deepening economic ties close to home, and countering China’s growing weight in ports, telecom, and logistics. State Department spokeswoman Tammy Bruce called the tour “a serious approach by the secretary to deal with the issues that directly affect our ability to get this nation back on her feet and to deal with why there is such high migration.” It’s less about ceremonies and more about getting governments to move in sync.
The regional mood is complicated. President Trump’s recent comments about “retaking” the Panama Canal rattled officials from Panama City to Washington. A brief trade dust-up with Colombia over immigration added to the noise. As Benjamin Gedan of the Wilson Center put it, this is “a really interesting moment for US relations with Latin America,” with big questions ahead about what the next four years look like.
Stops, stakes, and the politics behind them
Panama came first for a reason. Rubio met President José Raúl Mulino in Panama City and walked the Canal with its administrator. The Canal is more than symbolism; it’s a shipping artery that keeps U.S. supply chains moving. Drought constraints and global rerouting have made every decision around it more sensitive, especially when paired with Chinese firms’ growing footprint in surrounding logistics and infrastructure.
Panama’s relationship with Beijing has evolved over the last decade, and Chinese state-linked companies now show up in ports, telecom projects, and industrial parks. Rubio pressed on that front, stressing the security and economic risks of overreliance on China-linked vendors in critical systems around the Canal. He also leaned into migration cooperation. Panama sits on the Darién Gap—the jungle pass from Colombia that has become a major route for people heading north. The government has paired tighter controls with repatriation flights for non-Panamanian migrants. Washington wants more of that, done faster.
Trump’s talk of reclaiming the Canal complicated the backdrop. The Torrijos–Carter treaties transferred full control to Panama by 1999, and any suggestion of revisiting that deal sparks nationalist pushback. For Rubio, the task was to reassure Panamanian leaders that the U.S. wants to protect the Canal’s reliability, not undermine Panama’s sovereignty, while still warning against security risks that come with strategic infrastructure tied to China.
In El Salvador, the focus was public safety, migration, and jobs. Salvadorans have been among the largest groups arriving at the U.S. border in recent years. The U.S. pitch blends security cooperation with economic carrots—encouraging factories, logistics hubs, and services jobs to set up in Central America rather than Asia. That nearshoring push is supposed to reduce migration pressures by making it easier to stay and work at home.
Costa Rica brought a different angle. It’s a stable democracy with a service-heavy economy and a strong environmental brand. Washington sees it as a low-drama partner for clean energy, digital trade safeguards, and rules on trusted telecom networks. It’s the kind of place where U.S. companies can expand quickly if policy incentives and financing line up.
Guatemala sits at the heart of the migration story. Its location makes it a corridor, and its economy—heavy on agriculture and informality—leaves a lot of people looking north. Cooperation on returns and transit rules is one piece. The other is investment that actually lands outside capital cities. That means logistics links to ports, secure industrial parks, and training programs tied to real jobs. The pitch is straightforward: bring factories closer to the U.S. market, speed up shipping, and give people a reason not to leave.
The Dominican Republic is a trade swing state in the Caribbean. It already works closely with U.S. manufacturers, especially in textiles, medical supplies, and electronics assembly. That makes it a natural candidate for deeper supply-chain integration under the Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement. The question is how fast the U.S. can crowd in private capital with development finance tools and tax incentives, and how quickly local red tape can give way.
Two notable absences sent their own message. Rubio skipped Nicaragua, run by Daniel Ortega’s authoritarian government, and Honduras, where the president’s final year and alignment with Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro have strained ties with Washington. The omissions weren’t accidents; they showed where the administration thinks returns are possible—and where it wants distance.
The China piece ran through every stop. From port concessions to 5G vendors, Washington is trying to push partners toward “trusted” networks and away from contracts that could open the door to data risks or political leverage. Local leaders see the trade-offs: Chinese financing can be fast and flexible, but it often comes with opacity and debt concerns. U.S. support can feel slower, but it aims for transparent standards and long-term reliability. Expect more pressure on procurement rules, cybersecurity baselines, and ownership disclosures in strategic sectors.
Migration cooperation was the other constant. The Darién route has seen historic flows as people from South America, the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia make their way north. Panama’s stepped-up repatriations have cut some traffic, but bottlenecks shift fast. U.S. officials want a chain of enforcement, humane processing, and rapid returns that runs from Colombia through Central America to Mexico. That requires money, flights, and coordination the region hasn’t consistently sustained.
Trade policy tied it all together. DR-CAFTA gives the U.S. a ready-made platform for deeper integration with six neighbors. The pandemic and supply-chain shocks created a case for moving production closer to the U.S. consumer. The administration is betting that a mix of development finance, export credits, customs upgrades, and workforce training can tilt investment decisions away from East Asia and toward the isthmus and the Caribbean.
Domestic politics followed Rubio throughout. The Canal comments from Trump got headlines, but the practical work was quieter: reassure partners, push for specific steps on migration and infrastructure, and draw a line on China-linked vendors in critical systems. The balancing act is delicate—use leverage without blowing up relationships. Latin American governments want access to the U.S. market and investment; they also want to avoid choosing sides in a great-power contest.
The historical framing matters for expectations. When U.S. diplomacy has ignored the hemisphere, resentments grow. When it shows up only for crises, cooperation fades as soon as the news cycle moves on. Launching with Latin America sends a different signal. The real test, though, isn’t a first trip—it’s the follow-through over months and years.
What would follow-through look like? Think concrete migration compacts with targets for returns and processing times. More flights and funding for repatriations coordinated with the International Organization for Migration. Development Finance Corporation deals that convert memorandums of understanding into shovels in the ground. Technical help to harden ports, telecom networks, and customs systems against cyber and corruption risks. And regular, public check-ins so voters see progress.
There are risks. If Washington leans too hard without offering workable financing or political cover, local leaders may hedge with Beijing. If migration enforcement accelerates without parallel legal pathways for work, pressure could simply move to different routes. And if U.S. domestic fights over trade and immigration stall budgets, partners will notice—and plan accordingly.
Still, the structure is there. The region wants investment and market access. The U.S. wants secure borders, reliable supply chains, and less exposure to geopolitical shocks. The Canal remains a global choke point, and how Panama manages surrounding infrastructure—and who funds it—will shape security math for years. That’s why a first trip that starts on the isthmus and runs through DR-CAFTA capitals isn’t just symbolism; it’s a blueprint.
For now, the deliverables are more political than contractual: a reset of tone, a clear priority list, and a reminder that the Americas aren’t an afterthought in Washington. The next months will tell whether this early sprint can turn into steady, practical steps that change how goods, people, and data move through the hemisphere.
What to watch next:
- Specific announcements on repatriation funding and joint operations along the Darién route.
- New U.S.-backed projects for ports, energy, and telecom that meet transparent procurement and security standards.
- DR-CAFTA upgrades on customs digitization, labor enforcement, and dispute resolution that speed cross-border trade.
- Signals on Nicaragua and Honduras—sanctions, incentives, or outreach—depending on political shifts in both countries.
- Whether private capital follows the rhetoric into new industrial parks, logistics hubs, and service centers across the region.